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Abstract. In this paper we will present various hardware architecture designs 
for implementing the SIMON64/128 block cipher as a cryptographic compo-
nent offering encryption, decryption and self-contained key-scheduling capabil-
ities and discuss the issues and design options we encountered and the tradeoffs 
we made in implementing them. Finally, we will present the results of our 
hardware architectures’ implementation performances on the Xilinx Spartan-6 
FPGA series. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we will evaluate the SIMON family of block ciphers, in particular 
SIMON64/128, from the perspective of hardware implementations. In section 2 we 
will describe the SIMON family of block ciphers in general and the block cipher 
SIMON64/128 in particular. In section 3 we will describe various hardware architec-
ture designs for implementing SIMON64/128 as a cryptographic component offering 
encryption, decryption and self-contained key-scheduling capabilities and discuss the 
various design options and tradeoffs as well as the implementation issues we encoun-
tered. In section 4 we will present the performance results of our implementations on 
the Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA series. Finally, in section 5 we will discuss the limitations 
of our work and enumerate some possibilities for future work. 
2 The SIMON Family of Block Ciphers 
SIMON is a family of lightweight balanced Feistel block ciphers designed by the 
NSA [1] for high-performance in hardware to address security issues for highly con-
strained devices. As existing cryptographic algorithms were largely designed to meet 
the needs of desktop computing they are not particularly suited for use in the light-
weight applications that underpin the constrained platforms of so-called pervasive 
computing systems. The SIMON family (together with the SPECK family) have been 
proposed to address the growing need for flexible, lightweight cryptography. 
 
  
 
Fig. 1 SIMON parameters 
 
The SIMON family has a number of parameters that determine its specifics as shown 
in figure 1. We will refer to a SIMON block cipher with an n-bit word and m-bit key 
as SIMON2n/m, ie. a configuration with 32-bit words and a 128-bit key becomes 
SIMON64/128. 
2.1 Configuration 
We chose SIMON64/128 as our cipher configuration for the architecture implemen-
tations in our paper. While block sizes smaller than 128 bits can offer sub-standard 
security in certain scenarios (eg. short cycle problems in OFB mode, distinguishing 
attacks, etc.) we aimed at our implementation being compatible with the Xilinx Spar-
tan-6 [2] family of FPGAs and as such were restricted with regards to the number of 
available IOBs/pins. Our designs, however, are easily extendible to the SIMON128/
128 configuration offering a fully adequate security level. In the rest of this paper, 
our SIMON parameters will be as follows: 
 
 Block size: 64 
 Key size: 128 
 Word size: 32 
 Key words: 4 
 Constant sequence: z3 
 Rounds: 44 
2.2 Round Function 
The SIMON round function is an AND-RX construction with a balanced Feistel 
structure that utilizes the following operations: 
 
 Bitwise XOR, denoted as 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦. 
 Bitwise AND, denoted as 𝑥 & 𝑦. 
 Left bitwise rotation ROL, denoted as 𝑆𝑦(𝑥) where 𝑦 is the rotation count. 
 
 
Fig. 2 SIMON round function 
 
The SIMON round function (used for encryption) can be expressed as: 
 
𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑘) = ((𝑆1(𝑙) & 𝑆8(𝑙)) ⊕ 𝑆2(𝑙) ⊕ 𝑟 ⊕ 𝑘, 𝑙)  
 
And it’s inverse (used for decryption) as: 
 
𝑅−1(𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑘) = (𝑟, (𝑆1(𝑟) & 𝑆8(𝑟)) ⊕ 𝑆2(𝑟) ⊕ 𝑙 ⊕ 𝑘)  
 
Where 𝑙 is the left-most word of a given block, 𝑟 the right-most word and 𝑘 the ap-
propriate round round key. 
2.3 Key Schedule 
The SIMON key schedule provides key expansion capabilities by subsequently gen-
erating all round keys from the master key. In our chosen SIMON64/128 configura-
tion the key schedule generates 44 32-bit sized round keys from the initial 128-bit 
master key. It does so by, for a given round 𝑖, combining the currently cached previ-
ous 𝑛 round keys (where 𝑛 is the key words parameter) with constant 𝑐 and a 1-bit 
round constant. The key expansion function utilizes the following operations: 
 
 Bitwise XOR, denoted as 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦. 
 Right bitwise rotation ROR, denoted as 𝑆−𝑦(𝑥)  where 𝑦  is the rotation 
count. 
 
 
Fig. 3 SIMON 4-word key expansion 
 
The key expansion function can be expressed as: 
 
𝐾𝑖(𝑘, 𝑐, 𝑧𝑗) = 𝐹(𝑘𝑖+3, 𝑘𝑖+1) ⊕ 𝑆
−1(𝐹(𝑘𝑖+3, 𝑘𝑖+1)) ⊕ 𝑘𝑖 ⊕ 𝑐 ⊕ (𝑧𝑗)𝑖  
 
Where: 
 
 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑆−3(𝑥) ⊕ 𝑦 
 
And where after each expansion operation, the cached round keys are rotated right-
ward with the first being discarded and the last being replaced by the newly generated 
round key, ie.: 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖+𝑗 for 𝑗 = 0, . . ,2 and 𝑘𝑖+3 = 𝐾𝑖(𝑘, 𝑐, 𝑧𝑗). 
 
The SIMON key schedule employs a sequence of 1-bit round constants z𝑖 for purpos-
es of the elimination of slides properties and circular shift symmetries. In our configu-
ration that is (represented in little-endian): 
 
z3 =11110000101100111001010001001000000111101001100011010111011011 
 
In addition, the key schedule employs the constant c = 2𝑛 − 4 = 0xFF. . FC where n 
is the word size parameter, hence c = 232 − 4 in our configuration. 
2.4 Encryption 
Encryption of a 64-bit plaintext block 𝑝 simply consists of 44 applications of the 
round function with the respective round key produced by the key schedule. Due to 
the nature of the round and key expansion functions they can be run in parallel if so 
desired. 
2.5 Decryption 
Decryption of a 64-bit ciphertext block 𝑐 consists of first swapping the left- and right-
most 32-bit words followed by 44 applications of the round function but with round 
keys in reverse order (ie. round keys 43, . . ,0) followed by a final swapping of the left- 
and right-most words. 
3 Hardware Design 
In this section we will discuss the various hardware architectures in which SIMON 
can be implemented and the associated design options, issues and tradeoffs. Our im-
plementations were designed with Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) usage in 
mind, particularly the Xilinx Spartan-6 family. FPGAs consist of a multitude of 
(re)configurable universal slices which are connected in (re)configurable ways. The 
reconfigurable nature of the FPGA allows designers to implement various totally 
different functions on the same device. All discussed hardware architectures were 
implemented by us in VHDL [3], simulated using Mentor Graphics ModelSIM PE 
and performance- and synthesis-tested using Xilinx ISE Design Suite 14.7. 
 
Our implementations were not optimized with regards to particular performance char-
acteristics but rather serve to illustrate the options offered and problems posed by 
various hardware architectures as applied to SIMON and as a general indication of the 
cipher’s performance. As opposed to other work on the implementation of the 
SIMON family [4,5,6,7] we decided to implement each architecture as a fully func-
tional cryptographic component offering both encryption and decryption as well as 
self-contained key-scheduling capabilities. 
3.1 Tradeoffs 
In this sub-section we’ll briefly investigate several design tradeoffs we considered 
when implementing the architectures discussed further on as well as some tradeoffs to 
be considered by those seeking to build their own implementation of the given archi-
tectures. 
3.1.1 Dimensions of Parallelism 
As discussed by Aysu et al. [5] the block cipher design space offers several dimen-
sions of parallelism: rounds, encryptions and bits. The particular parallelism choices 
affect the performance results (both area and throughput) of a given cipher implemen-
tation. 
 
 Parallelism of Rounds: Within a given encryption component the number of 
rounds executed in parallel 𝑟  can range from 𝑟 = 1  to 𝑟 = #𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 . In-
creasing round parallelism requires corresponding (partial to full) loop un-
rolling and if so desired outer-round pipelining as discussed in section 3.6. 
Given that an increase in round parallelism comes with an increase in area, 
the choice for the degree of round parallelism 𝑟 depends on a throughput/cost 
tradeoff that can be determined from the throughput-to-area ratio. We chose 
to implement full loop unrolling and outer-round pipelining as area limit 
didn’t play a role in our implementations. 
 
 Parallelism of Encryptions: Given enough available area on the target FPGA 
one can use 𝑒 separate encryption components in parallel thus linearly in-
creasing the overall system throughput. When throughput maximization, ra-
ther than cost/area minimization, is the primary concern and the target plat-
form limit allows for it encryption parallelism of a suitable architecture with 
the best throughput-to-area ratio is recommended. 
 
 Parallelism of Bits: Within a given round operation the input size 𝑖 of the 
operators that make up its combinational logic can range from 1 to 𝑛 bits 
(where 𝑛 is the cipher block size). A round implemented with 𝑖 = 1 is called 
bit-serialized while a round with full parallelism (ie. 𝑖 = 𝑛) is called iterated 
and processes a full block during every clock cycle. Obviously 𝑖 is positively 
related to both throughput and area. Given the design specifications of 
SIMON64/128 and the capabilities offered by the Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA 
family we chose to implement all our designs as iterated designs with re-
spect to bit-parallelism. 
3.1.2 Block Cipher Modes of Operation 
Block ciphers are used in a so-called mode of operation which combines individual 
ciphertext blocks derived from individual plaintext blocks into a single ciphertext. As 
noted by Gaj et al. [8] certain block cipher design architectures lend themselves better 
to usage with certain modes of operation than others. Modes of operation can be di-
vided into two main categories: 
 
 Non-feedback modes: Where encryption of subsequent plaintext blocks can 
be performed independently from other blocks (eg. ECB, CTR, etc.) 
 
 Feedback modes: Where encryption of a block cannot start until encryption 
of the previous block is finished (eg. CBC, CFB, OFB, etc.) 
 
Hence feedback modes of operation require sequential processing without allowing 
for parallelism. As such those wishing to utilize a SIMON64/128 implementation for 
use in feedback modes could choose the loop unrolling architecture but should avoid 
the pipelining architectures. 
3.2 Round Function 
We first implemented the SIMON round function as a standalone component and 
reference for subsequent architectures. We implemented it as a combinational circuit 
directly expressing the round function 𝑅 as defined in section 2.2. 
 
Fig. 4 SIMON64/128 round function as combinational circuit 
3.3 Iterative Architecture 
We implemented SIMON64/128  as a basic iterative architecture. In the iterative 
architecture [9] the round function is implemented as a combinational circuit joined 
with a single register and multiplexer and connected to a signal feeding it the appro-
priate round key.  
 
 
Fig. 5 Basic iterative architecture (courtesy of slides by A. de la Piedra [10]) 
 
During the first clock cycle the plaintext block is fed to the circuit and stored in the 
register and with each subsequent clock cycle a cipher round is executed and its result 
is fed back into the circuit through the register. After 𝑛 clockcycles (where 𝑛 is the 
number of rounds) the register now holds the ciphertext block corresponding to the 
plaintext and key combination. As such only a single block of data is encrypted at a 
time and encryption of a plaintext block takes a number of clock cycles equal to the 
number of cipher rounds. 
 
3.3.1 Encryption and Decryption 
Our iterative design supports both encryption and decryption functionality which can 
be selected with a single-bit signal. Due to the balanced Feistel nature of SIMON, 
encryption and decryption are symmetric (save for the reverse order of round keys) 
and as such no additional components or circuitry is required for decryption function-
ality. The reversed round key scheduling, however, does pose a design problem. 
 
Given that the key schedule is iterative and every round key is derived from the pre-
vious 4 round keys we can run encryption and key expansion parallel, feeding the 
correct round key to the round function each cycle. However, since decryption con-
sumes the final round key as the first this means that we need to have pre-expanded 
all round keys before decryption commences since in order to generate the final round 
key we need to have already generated all others. In order to address this we decided 
to add a RAM component to our iterative design. The RAM component holds 44 32-
bit sized word cells to store the round keys which can then be written to or read from 
RAM as required.  
  
We have roughly two design options to integrate the RAM into our iterative architec-
ture: 
 
a) Separate: Pre-expansion is a separate phase next to the regular initialization 
and run phases where the SIMON component will run for 𝑛 = 44 clock cy-
cles each of which generates the corresponding round key and stores it in 
RAM. Subsequent encryption or decryption functionality will read the ap-
propriate round key from RAM based on the round index. This approach in-
troduces a slight area penalty as well as requiring both encryption and de-
cryption to be prefaced with 𝑛 additional pre-expansion cycles. 
 
b) Integrated: Pre-expansion is integrated into encryption functionality since 
during encryption key expansion can run in parallel and generated round 
keys can be stored in RAM as they are generated. This means that no sepa-
rate pre-expansion phase is required for encryption and that decryption can 
simply be prefaced with 44 additional rounds of encryption over a block of 
bogus data to pre-expand the key in memory for subsequent consumption by 
decryption rounds. 
 
We refer to the evaluation in section 4 for performance details. 
3.3.2 Key Schedule 
We chose to implement the key schedule as a combinational circuit generating round 
keys on the basis of a supplied round index 𝑟 and the left-shifting cache of the previ-
ous 4 round keys 𝑘𝑖 , . . , 𝑘𝑖+3. We also chose to conflate the 𝑐 and 𝑧3 constants to a 
single constant 𝐶 = 𝑐 ⊕ 𝑧3 for efficiency purposes. 
 
Given our requirement for round key storage in RAM, there are two different models 
of connecting key scheduling to the round function: 
 
a) RAM-routing: We connect the round keys output by the key schedule to the 
input of the RAM module and connect the output of the RAM module to the 
round function, introducing a single clock cycle delay between round key 
generation and consumption. In order to address this the initialization phase 
takes 2 clock cycles to align round keys with rounds and the key schedule 
will generate all round keys 𝑘𝑖  (𝑖 ∈ {0, . . ,43}). In addition, the key schedule 
output is also connected to the final word of the round key cache. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Ram-routing approach 
 
b) Cache-routing: We connect the first word of the round key cache to the 
round function and connect the output of the key schedule to the last word of 
the round key cache. In this fashion, round key 𝑘𝑖+4 will be fed into the left-
shifting cache in time for proper subsequent round key generation. The first 
word of the round key cache is also connected to the input of the RAM mod-
ule to fill it with the pre-expanded key for subsequent decryption operations. 
The first word of the round key cache is connected via a multiplexer to both 
the second word of the cache (for operating in encryption mode) and the out-
put of the RAM module (for operating in decryption mode). In this model 
the initialization phase takes only a single clock cycle but if the encryption 
mode is used for key pre-expansion purposes for subsequent decryption an 
additional cycle is needed to completely fill the RAM. In the cache-routing 
approach the key schedule will generate round keys 𝑘𝑖  (𝑖 ∈ {4, . . ,43}). 
 
 
Fig. 7 Cache-routing approach 
 
We implemented the integrated pre-expansion mentioned in section 3.3.1 with both 
models (RAM-routing and cache-routing) and implemented the separate pre-
expansion method with RAM-routing. We refer to the evaluation in section 4 for per-
formance details. 
  
3.4 Loop Unrolling Architecture 
We implemented an instance of SIMON64/128  as a (full) loop unrolling architec-
ture. In the loop unrolling architecture [9] single combinational parts of the circuit of 
an iterative architecture are ‘unrolled’ to implement 𝐾  rounds (where 1 ≤ 𝐾 ≤
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 and 𝐾|#rounds) of the cipher instead of a single round (with key schedul-
ing being unrolled in similar fashion). Hence the number of clock cycles necessary to 
encrypt or decrypt a block of data is decreased by a factor of 𝐾 and the minimum 
clock period is decreased by a factor slightly less than 𝐾 giving an overall increase in 
throughput and decrease in latency while simultaneously resulting in an increase in 
area more or less proportional to 𝐾 due to unrolling of combinational logic of round 
and key expansion functionality as well as the number of simultaneously stored round 
keys. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Loop unrolling architecture for 𝐾 = 2  
(courtesy of slides by A. de la Piedra [10]) 
 
In loop unrolling one has the choice between partial (𝐾 < #𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠) and full (𝐾 =
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠) unrolling where one has to make a tradeoff between throughput and area. 
Given that our Spartan-6 target platform is well-equipped to handle the maximum 
area increase that comes with full unrolling we chose to implement full unrolling in 
order to achieve maximum throughput for this particular architectural mode. It is of 
course possible to scale back our design to a partial unrolling architecture if so desired 
by re-introducing the feedback loop and multiplexer of the basic iterative architecture. 
 
As noted by Gaj et al. [9], however, full loop unrolling is recommended only for 
block ciphers operating in feedback modes of operation in implementations which can 
tolerate large circuit area increases. 
  
3.4.1 Round Function 
We replicated the round 𝐾 = 44 times to implement full unrolling, inter-connecting 
each round with the next and connecting every round to the appropriate signal deliver-
ing the round key from the unrolled key scheduling circuit. In this manner the 
plaintext is transformed into ciphertext by executing 44 round function operations in a 
single clock cycle. 
3.4.2 Key Schedule 
Key scheduling was fully unrolled by replicating the scheduling function 𝐾 = 44 
times and both connecting the round key carrying output of every unrolled operation 
to the appropriate unrolled round and inter-connecting the unrolled key scheduling 
operations in order to make sure all round keys are generated in a single clock cycle. 
3.4.3 Encryption and Decryption 
Encryption and decryption functionality differs from the iterative architecture in that 
no RAM is required anymore (due to full unrolling of the key schedule). Hence in the 
full loop unrolling architecture, decryption does not require a pre-expansion step. In 
addition, both encryption and decryption require only a single clock cycle. 
3.5 Inner-Round Pipelining Architecture 
We implemented an instance of SIMON64/128  as an inner-round pipelining archi-
tecture derived from the iterative architecture (of the integrated, cache-routing varie-
ty) described in section 3.3. In the inner-round pipelining architecture [9] the designer 
starts out with the basic iterative architecture and performs the following steps: 
 
 The round function is divided into 𝑛 independent sub-functions. 
 𝐾 registers are inserted between the round sub-functions where 1 ≤ 𝐾 ≤ 𝑛. 
 The optimal 𝐾 is determined that balances throughput and area. 
 
The insertion of registers inside a cipher round increases throughput while only min-
imally increasing area, resulting in an overall increase of the throughput-to-area ratio 
up until the optimal value for 𝐾 (after which throughput may keep increasing but the 
throughput-to-area ratio will start decreasing). In the inner-round pipelining architec-
ture the designer has to find the optimal 𝐾  (within area constraint bounds) that 
achieves the best throughput-to-area ratio. 
 
 
Fig. 9 Inner-round pipelining architecture for 𝐾 = 4  
(courtesy of slides by A. de la Piedra [10]) 
 
During our design and implementation of inner-round pipelining of SIMON64/128  
we encountered several limits which we will discuss in section 3.5.1. 
3.5.1 Round Function 
We started out by constructing a partitioning tree of the SIMON round function 
𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑘) = ((𝑆1(𝑙) & 𝑆8(𝑙)) ⊕ 𝑆2(𝑙) ⊕ 𝑟 ⊕ 𝑘, 𝑙): 
 
 
Fig. 10 SIMON round function partitioning showing options for inner-round register 
insertion. 
 
  
As shown by figure 10, the SIMON round function can be divided into 3 independent 
sub-functions: 
 
𝛾(𝑟, 𝑘) = 𝑟 ⊕ 𝑘 
𝜑(𝑙) = (𝑆1(𝑙) & 𝑆8(𝑙)) ⊕ 𝑆2(𝑙) 
𝜓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦 
So that: 
𝑅(𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑘) = (𝜓(𝜑(𝑙), 𝛾(𝑟, 𝑘)), 𝑙) 
 
Obviously, semantically 𝛾 = 𝜓 and as such requires only a single component defini-
tion in the VHDL specification. This division offers 3 (since there already is a register 
supplied by the iterative architecture before 𝛾 and after 𝜓) potential options for inner-
round register insertion, namely: after 𝛾, after 𝜑 and after both. 
 
Since the SIMON family of block ciphers are Feistel networks this limits our options 
for inner-round pipelining due to the fact that at the beginning of a round the right 
word is to be the previous left word and the left word the result of the previous right 
word put through the round function. Since inner-round pipelining delays the availa-
bility of the round function output by 𝐾 clock cycles this means that the left word 
(derived from the round function) for a given round cannot be available in time which 
prohibits pipelining round sub-functions derived from it (such as only inserting a 
register after 𝜑 without a balancing register after 𝛾). As such we did not further inves-
tigate options for pipelining the operations internal to the sub-function 𝜑. 
 
We explored options for using 32-bit negative-edge triggered registers (so that during 
every clock cycle starting at a rising edge the register consumes the output of the 
pipelined sub-function after the falling edge and it is available at the end of the same 
cycle) but due to the deadline constraints of this project and the overall absence of 
detailed literature on the matter of inner-round pipelining for Feistel networks, we 
have restricted ourselves to implementing experimental inner-round pipelining de-
signs for the options 𝐾 = 1 (register insertion after 𝛾) and 𝐾 = 2 (register insertion 
after both 𝜑 and 𝛾). We did not, however, have time to implement test benches or 
thoroughly verify their correctness and as such have not included corresponding per-
formance figures in section 4. 
3.6 Outer-Round Pipelining Architecture 
We implemented an instance of SIMON64/128  as an outer-round pipelining archi-
tecture derived from the loop unrolling architecture described in section 3.4. In the 
outer-round pipelining architecture [9] the designer determines the number of rounds 
𝐾  that can be loop-unrolled without exceeding the maximum designated (either 
through availability or other restrictions) circuit area and inserts registers inside the 
combinational circuit between all subsequent cipher rounds. 
 
 
Fig. 11 Outer-round pipelining architecture for 𝐾 = 2  
(courtesy of slides by A. de la Piedra [10]) 
 
 
This allows for the simultaneous processing of 𝐾 blocks of data by the outer-round 
pipelined circuit (given that each of the 𝐾 blocks can be stored at the 𝐾 different reg-
isters at the end of a given clock cycle) leading to a corresponding increase in both 
throughput and area. Given that we established in section 3.4 that full loop unrolling 
is possible within our area constraints we decided to implement full outer-round pipe-
lining. 
3.6.1 Encryption and Decryption 
Round, key expansion, encryption and decryption functionality was implemented 
identical to the full loop unrolling architecture with the addition of a series of 43 (due 
to the final round being connected directly to the output as opposed to a feedback 
register) 64-bit positive-edge triggered registers in between the unrolled rounds in the 
encryption and decryption component. While encryption and decryption both take 
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 clock cycles to complete, as in the iterative architecture, in the latter new 
blocks of plaintext can be fed into the system only once every #𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 clock cycles 
while in the full outer-round pipelining architecture a new plaintext block can be fed 
into the system every clock cycle. 
3.7 Mixed Inner-Outer-Round Pipelining Architecture 
We implemented an instance of SIMON64/128  as a mixed inner-outer-round pipe-
lining architecture derived from the outer-round pipelining architecture described in 
section 3.6. Given that mixed pipelining offers a significant improvement on through-
put compared to outer-round pipelining and the circuit area limit is large enough we 
can use our fully unrolled outer-round pipelining architecture as the based for the 
mixed architecture.  
 
 
Fig. 12 Mixed pipelining architecture for 𝐾𝑖 = 2, 𝐾𝑜 = 2  
(courtesy of slides by A. de la Piedra [10]) 
 
In the mixed pipelining architecture [9] the designer starts out with a partially or fully 
unrolled outer-round pipelining architecture and replaces the round function by the 
round function of the optimal case 𝐾 found in the inner-round pipelining architecture, 
giving an architecture with 𝐾𝑖  inner-round registers and 𝐾𝑜  outer-round registers. 
Given that our inner-round pipelining designs in section 3.5 were, as of publication, 
merely experimental and still untested we established a provisional optimum of 𝐾 =
2 and implemented a mixed pipelining architecture with 𝐾𝑖 = 2, 𝐾𝑜 = 43. We devel-
oped test-benches that confirm the correctness of our implementation but due to the 
untested nature of the inner-round pipelining design the performance results obtained 
by the mixed pipelining architecture implementation are to be considered purely pro-
visional. 
3.7.1 Encryption and Decryption 
The round function was implemented identical to that of the inner-round pipelining 
architecture for 𝐾 = 2 while key expansion, encryption and decryption functionality 
where implemented identical to the outer-round pipelining architecture. Encryption 
and decryption both take 1 additional clock cycle compared with the outer-round 
pipelining architecture and a new plaintext block can be fed into to the system every 
clock cycle. 
4 Performance 
In this section we provide an overview of the performance results of the implementa-
tions discussed in section 3. The area and throughput performance figures were de-
rived either directly or partially from the results obtained by full design implementa-
tion of our VHDL code using Xilinx ISE Design Suite 14.7. 
 
We have refrained from a comparison between the performance results of our imple-
mentations and those of other SIMON implementations or similar lightweight block 
ciphers. This is primarily because this work does not seek to present particularly op-
timized implementations but also since (as noted elsewhere [8]) it is inherently diffi-
cult to perform such a comparison reliably and meaningfully since different authors 
implement their designs under different assumptions and with different optimization 
goals (eg. different platform assumptions, different levels of parallelism, different 
optimization goals, unclarity regarding implementation completeness: is decryption 
and key scheduling implemented or not, etc.). As such the results presented in this 
section serve as a guide to choosing the appropriate design architecture for imple-
menting SIMON. 
4.1 Area 
The area required by cipher implementations is an important parameter since it is 
positively correlated with production cost and the viability of implementation on a 
certain platform is determined by its area limit.  
 
Architecture Area  
(#occupied slices) 
Area  
(#slice registers) 
Area  
(#slice LUTs) 
Round Function 24 0 32 
Iterative* 148 201 353 
Iterative** 105 202 329 
Iterative*** 113 199 328 
Full loop unrolling 
(𝐾 = 44) 
2952 0 8096 
Full Outer-Round 
Pipelining (𝐾 = 44) 
1149 2752 4096 
Mixed Pipelining 
(𝐾𝑖 = 2, 𝐾𝑜 = 44) 
2161† 5568† 6459† 
Table 1 Area results 
* = (Integrated pre-expansion, Cache-routing), ** = (Integrated pre-expansion, Ram-
routing), *** = (Separate pre-expansion, Ram-routing) , † = provisional results. 
 
Since our designs were implemented with FPGA usage in mind we will measure the 
required area in so-called occupied slices which are the number of basic FPGA blocks 
occupied by our implementation. A slice contains a given number of LUTs (set of 
hardwired logic gates), flip-flops, multiplexers, etc. and is differently implemented 
depending on the FPGA family. Table 1 lists the total number of occupied slices (and 
the number of slice registers and slice LUTs that they are composed of as reported by 
Xilinx ISE) for each design implementation. 
4.2 Throughput 
Throughput measures the number of bits that can be processed (eg. encrypted or de-
crypted) by the component in a certain unit of time. Given the Feistel network nature 
of the SIMON family and hence the equality of encryption and decryption round 
functions, throughput rates for encryption and decryption are equal and hence we will 
report throughput as a single parameter. Table 2 lists the various architectures, the 
formula for determining their throughput and the actual throughput rates. Keep in 
mind that throughput rates for the round function concern a single round not a full 
block encryption. 
 
Architecture Throughput Throughput rate 
(Mbit/s) 
Round Function 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑘
 
9985.957 
Iterative* 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑘
 
242.303 
Iterative** 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑘
 
206.524 
Iterative*** 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑘
 
269.760 
Full loop unrolling 
(𝐾 = 44) 
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝐾 ∗ 𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑘
 
479.300 
Full Outer-Round Pipe-
lining (𝐾 = 44) 
𝐾 ∗ 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑘
 
33109.157 
Mixed Pipelining 
(𝐾𝑖 = 2, 𝐾𝑜 = 44) 
𝐾𝑜 ∗ 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
#𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑘(𝐾𝑖)
 
11666.059† 
Table 2 Throughput results 
* = (Integrated pre-expansion, Cache-routing), ** = (Integrated pre-expansion, Ram-
routing), *** = (Separate pre-expansion, Ram-routing), † = provisional results, 
𝑇𝑐𝑙𝑘 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦. 
  
4.3  Throughput-To-Area Ratio 
Different applications require different optimization goals. For example, for many 
lightweight applications (eg. cryptography in RFID applications) throughput itself is 
not the top priority as only relatively small volumes of data are to be processed. Given 
that in general, however, we seek to maximize throughput and minimize area but that 
both are positively related (ie. an increase in throughput usually requires a corre-
sponding increase in area), one usually has to look at the throughput-to-area ratio 
(expressed in the number of bits processed per time unit per area unit) rather than 
either parameter in isolation. If we combine the performance results in table 1 with 
those in table 2 we get throughput-to-area ratio table 3. Keep in mind that throughput 
rates for the round function concern a single round not a full block encryption. 
 
Architecture Throughput 
rate (Mbit/s) 
Area  
(#occupied slic-
es) 
Throughput-To-
Area (Mbit/s 
per slice) 
Round Function 9985.957 24 416.082 
Iterative* 242.303 148 1.637 
Iterative** 206.524 105 1.967 
Iterative*** 269.760 113 2.387 
Full loop unrolling 
(𝐾 = 44) 
479.300 2952 0.163 
Full Outer-Round 
Pipelining (𝐾 = 44) 
33109.157 1149 28.816 
Mixed Pipelining 
(𝐾𝑖 = 2, 𝐾𝑜 = 44) 
11666.059† 2161† 5.398† 
Table 3 Area results 
* = (Integrated pre-expansion, Cache-routing), ** = (Integrated pre-expansion, Ram-
routing), *** = (Separate pre-expansion, Ram-routing), † = provisional results. 
5 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we presented several architectural designs for implementing the 
SIMON64/128 block cipher and the options and tradeoffs that come with these de-
signs and the issues encountered during their implementation. We presented their 
performance results which show the SIMON family of block ciphers is well-suited as 
a candidate for applications requiring flexible, lightweight cryptography. 
 
As discussed in sections 3.5.1 and 3.7 due to project deadline constraints we were 
unable to properly validate the implementations of our inner-round pipelining designs 
and their corresponding performance figures. As a result both the implementation and 
performance figures of the mixed pipelining architecture are to be considered provi-
sional. The finalization of these implementations, their thorough testing and the inclu-
sion of their performance figures for comparison with those presented in section 4 are 
left to future work. 
 
Neither our designs presented in section 3 nor their specific implementations [3] and 
the derived performance results in section 4 were optimized with respect to any per-
formance metric or parameter. As such the performance results could be improved by 
introducing such optimizations as has been done in related work [5]. 
 
Our designs have not been hardened against possible side-channel attacks (eg. power 
analysis, fault injection, etc.) or tampering efforts. Given the threat posed by such 
attacks, research in this direction (as done by related work [7]) is a fruitful area for 
future work. 
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